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INTRODUCTION
There is widespread agreement that achieving the very substantial reductions
in

greenhouse

gas

(GHG)

emissions

necessary to

stabilize

GHG

concentrations at 450 to 750 parts per million (ppm) will require innovation
and large-scale adoption of GHG-reducing technologies throughout the global
1

energy system. The associated policy debate is therefore not so much over
the importance of new technology per se in solving the climate problem, but
rather over what the most effective policies and institutions are for achieving
the dramatic technological changes and associated emission reductions
necessary for stabilization.
Although many policies and institutions relevant to green innovation have
been discussed, one area to which relatively little attention has been paid until
recently is intellectual property rights (IPRs). The absence of attention may
stem from the reality that IPRs are, by design, decentralized, market-driven
incentives that presume appropriate market signals on the demand side. In
the area of green innovation, by contrast, the primary problem has been the
absence of appropriate greenhouse gas (GHG) pricing and hence the
absence of an appropriate demand side signal.

However, assuming the

demand side problem is fixed (through interventions such as carbon taxes or
2

cap and trade systems,)

then the issue of how IPRs – and various

alternatives to IPRs – can most usefully play a role in fostering the supply of
green innovation will necessarily come to the fore.
In this report, we provide an analysis of how IPRs, and alternatives to IPRs,
might operate in green innovation.

Part I of the paper discusses the

economics of green innovation, including the important role that will need to
be played by the private sector. Because of the critical role of the private
sector, demand side issues will need to be fixed in order for there to be an
appropriate level of green innovation.

Part II discusses the IPR issues,

principally involving patents, that may arise if and when GHG externalities are
addressed through the appropriate pricing of greenhouse gases. Because
these problems will primarily arise in the future (if at all), we rely heavily in this

1
IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing
Team, Pachauri, R.K and Reisinger, A.(eds.)]. IPCC: Geneva, Switzerland, 2007.
2
For reviews of the policy options to limit greenhouse gas emissions, including the effect of such
policies on private sector innovation, see Robert N. Stavins & Joseph Aldy, (Eds.), Architectures
For Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change In The Post-Kyoto World , Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007; Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, Reconstructing
Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto, Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2003,
available at:
http://www.aei.org/publications/bookID.211/book_detail.asp .
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part on analogies to current technological sectors (and sections thereof) that
are currently experiencing difficulties. Part III addresses alternatives to
traditional patents and exclusive licenses, including patent pools, liability
rules, and prizes.
Currently, more than 95% of global R&D takes place in OECD countries.
Thus Parts II and III primarily address IPR difficulties for R&D in these
countries. However, if climate change is going to be addressed successfully,
clean technology must be adopted globally. Thus, in Part IV, we examine at
some length the international context. cuses on intellectual property buyouts,
the potential for international R&D treaties, impediments to technology
transfer that may be posed by IPRs, and the use of IPRs to stimulate
indigenous innovation in developing countries.

www.chathamhouse.org.uk
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I. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
While the idea of balancing the atmospheric GHG stock by reducing the net
GHG flow to zero seems simple enough, the technological reality of what it
will take to do this is far from simple. Currently 69 percent of global
anthropogenic GHG emissions come from fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and
3

natural gas, which satisfy 81 percent of global energy supply. The remainder
of global energy is supplied by renewable energy (13 percent) and nuclear
4

power (6 percent). Stabilizing GHG concentrations will therefore require
large-scale and widespread substitution toward energy technologies with low
to zero net GHG emissions throughout the global energy system.

New

technologies may also be needed in other sectors to reduce GHG emissions,
such as improved agricultural methods or crop varieties to reduce the
conversion of forests (which sequester carbon) to farmland; improved
technologies for biofuels that avoid raising corn prices and thereby spurring
deforestation; and improved agricultural techniques to produce crops and
raise ruminant animals with reduced emissions of methane and nitrous oxide.
To gauge, in economic terms, the magnitude of the innovation challenge
presented by climate change, it is helpful to consider possible targets for
5

GHG reduction and the projected costs of achieving these targets. These
projected costs, most commonly measured in terms of reduced Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), indicate the scale of the benefit that could come
from innovations that significantly reduce (or eliminate) the cost disadvantage
of climate-friendly technologies relative to the competition. Many proposals,
and most analyses, have centered on reduction paths that are consistent with
ultimate stabilization targets in the range of 450-550 ppm CO2. Modeling
scenarios of cost-effective global climate mitigation policy suggest that, for
targets in this range, the cost of GHG mitigation through 2050 is trillions or
tens of trillions of dollars of discounted GDP, or an annualized cost in the tens
to hundreds of billions per year. Longer-term total costs through 2100 are
approximately double this amount. While these estimates are based on
numerous economic and policy assumptions, they give a sense of the
magnitude of the payoff from innovations that could significantly lower the
cost of achieving various GHG reduction goals.

3
IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007, Paris: IEA/OECD, 2007. IEA, CO2 Emissions from Fuel
Combustion: Emissions of CO2, CH4, N2O, HFC, PFC, FS6, Vol 2007 release 01. Paris:
OECD/IEA, 2007.
4
IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007.
5
Richard G. Newell, A U.S. Innovation Strategy for Climate Change Mitigation, Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, Forthcoming 2009.
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Many studies demonstrate the central role that the availability and cost of
advanced energy technologies plays in determining the cost of achieving
6

various GHG reduction goals. Virtually all studies find that a cost-effective
technology solution entails a mix of energy efficiency, low-GHG energy
supply, as well as emission reductions in non-CO2 GHGs. Thus, R&D
supporting such a transition must also be broad based, covering a wide range
of technological opportunities. For example, one study finds that if we were
limited to technologies available in 2005, the present value cost of achieving
stabilization at 550 ppm CO2 would be over $20 trillion greater than with
expected developments in energy efficiency, hydrogen energy technologies,
7

advanced bioenergy, and wind and solar technologies. While it is not
typically made explicit in these models, they presume a significant degree of
innovative effort in the form of R&D, learning, and diffusion of new
technologies that would have to underpin these assumed technological
improvements.
Other studies have found that accelerated technology development offers the
potential to dramatically reduce the costs of stabilization, with advanced
technology scenarios reducing the cumulative costs of stabilization by 50
percent or more, yielding economic benefits of hundreds of billions to trillions
8

of dollars globally (Figure 1). While one might reasonably argue over detailed
modeling

assumptions,

these

and

other

results

demonstrate

that

technological advances have the potential to significantly decrease the costs
of attaining societal goals for climate change mitigation. The challenge is to
structure policy to maximize the likelihood that we will harness these
technological opportunities as effectively and efficiently as possible.
With respect to technological innovation, both the public and private sector
play a critical role. However, in terms of scale, the private sector is currently
the major actor. One useful indicator of innovative activity is R&D spending.
Industry is by far the largest player in R&D spending, funding over 60 percent
and performing almost 70 percent of R&D globally in 2006 (the most recent
year for which complete data are available). This industrial R&D is stimulated
by market demand for technologically advanced products and processes.
Establishing a GHG emission price (through policies such as cap-and-trade
and emission taxes) is thus essential from a technology perspective: such
pricing creates a demand-driven, profit-based incentive for the private sector
to gain from selling low-GHG products that are currently available and, more

6

IPCC, Op. Cit.
Jae Edmonds et al., Global Energy Technology Strategy: Addressing Climate Change, 2007,
available at: http://www.pnl.gov/gtsp/docs/infind/cover.pdf

7
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importantly, to invest effort in developing new, lower-cost climate-friendly
innovations.
If private-sector profit incentives are not clearly aligned with societal GHG
reduction goals then any public R&D spending will likely push against an
insurmountable tide. Conveniently, as discussed further in Part IV, the vast
majority of innovative effort globally currently takes place in the developed
countries that are expected to take the most significant initial steps towards
implementing GHG emission pricing.
For GHG emission policy to provide an effective inducement to innovation,
however, it is critical that the policy be credible to the private sector over the
long-term. Given the sometimes substantial time lags between initial
discovery and profitable market penetration, companies must be confident
that there will indeed be sufficient demand once their innovations reach the
market. Such confidence would be increased by domestic policies and
international agreements that put in place GHG emission targets whose
stringency is spelled out for many decades in advance, and that provide
stable financial incentives across a wide array of technological solutions.
Of course, government funding of relevant basic research does exist and
could grow beyond its current levels. Thus the discussion below addresses
at some length the special IPR issues raised by publicly funded research.

II. GREEN TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A SURVEY
OF THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS
As discussed in Section I, innovation in the climate mitigation arena faces an
environmental externality problem not raised by other types of innovation.
The GHG externality must be addressed on the technology demand side, by
putting a price on greenhouse gases.

But the GHG externality does not

represent the only potential barrier to innovation. In this section, we address
IPR issues that need to be thought through, particularly as the GHG
externality is increasingly addressed.
In recent years, a few analysts have begun to address how IPRs might affect
the development of green technologies. Given the early stage of research in
certain areas, and in the absence of appropriate GHG pricing in most of the
world, this analysis is necessarily quite speculative.

Nonetheless, some

analysts have suggested reasons why patenting and associated restrictive

8

Richard G. Newell, Op. Cit.
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practices might pose impediments to creation and diffusion of climate-friendly
technologies.

In contrast, others have seen little current evidence of

dysfunction and have suggested that strong patent rights may assist in the
development and dissemination of environmentally friendly technologies.
Unfortunately, given the relatively nascent stage of much of the technology,
there is little compelling empirical evidence to support either point of view.
At the moment, green technology looks too heterogeneous to be subject to
any

across-the-board

generalizations.

Unlike

other

heterogeneous

technologies, moreover, (e.g., nanotechnology), the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) does not recognize green technology as a class.
Thus it is not necessarily easy to find reliable quantitative information about
patent rights in green technology.
However, there is considerable evidence that the patent system is not
9

functioning effectively

in some other areas of technology, particularly

information technology and to some extent biotechnology. Controversy over
the existing system has spurred concerted efforts to implement patent reform
in the United States.

It has also blocked attempts to further harmonize

substantive patent law norms in a proposed WIPO treaty.

10

Accordingly, we begin this section by examining the operation of the patent
system with respect to other technologies for which we have considerable
evidence. Because of the possibility that a significant percentage of green
innovation may eventually have a publicly funded component, we pay special
attention to the role of IPRs in areas such as biotechnology that rely
substantially on public funding of relevant basic research. We then discuss
green innovation, both generally and in particular sectors. In each of the
major sectors, we suggest scenarios for the future by drawing upon the roles,
both positive and negative, that IPR is playing in other, more developed areas
of innovation.

a. The Existing Evidence for Other Technologies

1. Innovation Generally
The economic and legal literature on IPRs has long recognized the positive
role that such rights (and particularly patents) can play in the innovation

9

For discussion of this evidence, see notes __ and accompanying text.
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context. The most obvious positive role involves the incentive effects that
should emerge if the innovator can capture a substantial percentage of the
very significant positive externalities associated with innovation (as defined to
include

initial

invention,

further

development,

and

ultimate

commercialization/diffusion). Economists have estimated that social rates of
11

return from innovation can be 30% or more.

Although innovators should be

able to capture some of this return through mechanisms such as head start
advantages

and trade secrecy, patents

also represent

a powerful

12

mechanism.

A related, potentially positive, effect is the role patents can play in creating
small-firm-driven “markets for technology.” Economic theory suggests that
patents should help to ensure that information retains its value even when it is
13

disclosed outside the boundaries of the firm.

In other words, patents

should allow innovation rents to be appropriated even when a firm is not
vertically integrated and thus cannot itself participate in all stages of the R&D
process. To the extent that a system of industrial organization that includes
small firms and markets is likely to yield more innovation (particularly
cumulative innovation) than a system that comprises only large, vertically
14

integrated firms,

patents’ role in promoting the former type of industrial

organization is important.
To some extent, the available empirical evidence backs these propositions on
the positive role played by patents. In particular, for small firms, patents do
appear to play a positive role in attracting venture capital, particularly in the
biotechnology industry. One study reports that 50% of biotechnology firms
that received venture capital (VC) backing in the late 1990s held patents;

15

moreover, this 50% is probably an underestimate, because (as discussed

10

See, Jerome H. Reichman & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, “Harmonization Without Consensus:
Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty”, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 57, No.
85, 2007, pp. 85-130.
11
See, Charles Jones, “Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas”, American
Economic Review, Vol. 92, No. 1, 2002, p. 220.
12
In general, empirical studies have found that social rates of return from private firm research
and development are at least twice private rates of return. Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams,
“Measuring the Social Return to R&D”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 4, 1998,
p.1119.
13
See, Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri and Alfonso Gambardella, “Markets for Technology and
their Implications for Corporate Strategy”, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2001,
pp. 419-451.
14
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper & Brothers,
1942, p.13 (making the theoretical point that entrepreneurial firms may be more likely than large
firms with vested interests in existing products to be able to be able to move outside routine tasks
into “untried technological possibilities”); see also William J. Baumol, The Free-Market
Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2002; Zoltan Acs and David Audretsch, Innovation and Small Firms (MIT Press 1990);
David Audretsch, Innovation and Industry Evolution, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995
(presenting empirical data on the extent to which significant innovations in biotechnology and
information technology have been driven by small firms).
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further below) many biotechnology firms receive exclusive licenses on
university-backed research.

16

For large, publicly traded firms, by contrast, the evidence indicates that in the
1990s, U.S. patents had significant private value (i.e. value for appropriating
returns from innovation) primarily in the chemical and pharmaceutical
17

sectors.

In the pharmaceutical and medical device sectors, the cost of

regulatory approval for end products make patent protection for such products
(or marketing exclusivities that resemble patent protection, such as those
provided by the Orphan Drug Act) a virtual sine qua non.
Patents can also pose obstacles for innovation. Many of these obstacles
consist of transaction cost problems that can arise in the licensing necessary
for follow-on innovation. For example, as a historical matter, progress in the
automobile and aircraft industries was hampered by problems in licensing
18

broad patents on foundational platforms.

In other areas, problems

associated with broad patents on research platforms were narrowly averted.
In the area of computer hardware, the threat of broad patents loomed large
until government action forced licensing of the AT&T transistor patent as well
as patents obtained by Texas Instruments and Fairchild Instruments on
integrated circuits. As for software, it was already a robust industry before
software patents became available, at least in any widespread fashion.
A relatively small number of broad patents on foundational research do not
represent the only potential difficulty.

There is also the possibility that a

follow-on inventor will be deterred by the need to clear rights on a “thicket”
of overlapping patents

20

19

that cover either a research platform or individual

components of an end product. In this regard, it bears mention that a 2003 IP
survey of IP managers found that 23% said that competitor patents played an

15

Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager, “Patents, Venture Capital, and Software Start-Ups”,
Research Policy, Vo. 36, 2007, pp. 193-208.
Additionally, the late 1990s represented a time when venture capital markets were relatively
robust.
17
James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Patent Failure: How Judges, Bureaucrats, and Lawyers
Put Innovators at Risk, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, especially Chapters 5 and 6
(collecting existing research data based on patent renewal statistics and market value
regressions and presenting new data).; see also Wesley Cohen, Richard Nelson, & John Walsh,
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why Manufacturing Firms
Patent (or Not), NBER Working Paper Series, No. 7752, Feb. 2000 (finding, based on survey
conducted in 1990s, that R&D managers in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries ranked
the effectiveness of patents higher than managers in other industries). In fact, according to one
analysis that relied on renewal data, market value regressions, and event studies in attempting to
calculate both the private value of patents and the private costs of patent litigation, the net private
incentive provided by the patent system outside the chemical and pharmaceutical industries had,
by the late 1990s, turned negative. See Bessen & Meurer, Op. Cit.
18
R.P. Merges & R.R. Nelson, “On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope”, Columbia Law
Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, 1990, p. 839.
19
Carl Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools and Standard
Setting”, in Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy
1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001, pp. 119-150.
16
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important role in decisions to abandon development of otherwise promising
technologies.

21

Currently, these problems appear to be most salient in the

area of information and communications (ICT) technology.

22

Not only do

products in information technology represent combinations of dozens if not
hundreds of patented components, but patent claims in this area often do not
give clear notice of their boundaries.
Even where patent thickets do not prevent projects from going forward,

23

they

create the potential for inefficient holdup. If a follow-on improver has to clear
rights on a plethora of patents with vague boundaries, it may either miss
certain patents or simply not bother with the rights-clearing exercise. The
patent holder can then sue for infringement after the improver has already
invested. And to the extent that the patent holder is able credibly to assert
the threat of injunctive relief, it may be able to appropriate from the improver
far more than the value of their patent.
Holdup problems are particularly salient in the related context of standardsetting, where substantial investments in standards are often made prior to a
patent holder’s coming forward to assert its claim. Although these types of
problems are usually associated with the ICT industries, they can arise in
other industries. Indeed, one prominent recent case of alleged patent abuse
in a standard setting context directly involved environmental technology. In
this 2003 case, the Federal Trade Commission alleged that the Union Oil
Company of California (“Unocal”) violated Section 5 of the FTC Act in falsely
representing to the California Air Resources Board that it did not have
relevant patent interests when it participated in a standard setting exercise
involving the composition of low-emissions gasoline. In fact, according to the
FTC, Unocal had begun the process of obtaining relevant patents. After the
standard had been adopted, and other refiners had made investments to
comply with the standard, Unocal obtained and disclosed the patents. When
other refiners filed suit to have the patents declared invalid and not infringed,
Unocal counterclaimed with a charge of infringement.

The court found

Unocal’s patents valid and infringed and ordered the other refiners to pay
royalties that could exceed $500 million.

20

Patent law explicitly allows for overlapping, or blocking, patents.
Iain Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Survey Results from the 2003 Intellectual Property
Owners Association Survey on Strategic Management of Intellectual Property, Oct. 2003,
available
at:
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conte
ntFileID=55152
22
As discussed further below, the situation in biotechnology is less clear.
23
For example, there is some dispute about the extent to which firms in the information
technology industries bother to examine the patent landscape. To the extent that they do not do
such examination, they may not be deterred by patent thickets.
21
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In certain cases the potential problems caused by patents do not involve
transaction cost difficulties associated with licensing foundational research for
follow-on work or negotiating patent thickets. Rather, the prospect of patents
24

may lead to “too much” R&D – that is, rent-dissipating races.

Moreover,

because patent law sometimes allows multiple parties to own overlapping
patents over what is essentially the same technology, some races may have
multiple victors. In that case, the overlapping patents held by multiple parties
may lead to substantial, and expensive, litigation.

A case in point is

microarray technology. Microrrays are a powerful genomic research platform
that involves depositing short DNA sequences on a support medium as a
mechanism to test for gene expression. Over the past decade, multiple firms
(including Affymetrix, Hyseq, Incyte, and Oxford Gene Technologies) that
raced to dominate the platform have tangled in court with respect to patents
25

they hold on this platform.

Although many of these suits have resulted in

settlements involving cross-licensing, with the result that no firm is currently a
monopoly provider, it is unclear whether microarray patents have, on balance,
been beneficial.
In the case of microarray technology, the overlapping patents held by multiple
firms were arguably the consequence of an inefficient race. In other cases,
particularly in the information technology industry, firms may amass patent
portfolios that overlap heavily with those of their competitors and are used
almost

exclusively for

defensive

purposes.

Although

this

defensive

accumulation of patents appears at best inefficient, and at worst can be used
to exclude competitors that do not have such patents, eliminating defensive
use poses an obvious collective action problem.
Problems with foundational patents, patent thickets, races, and patent
portfolios, are exacerbated when patents are of low quality. Low quality can
stem from patentability standards that are too lax or from the PTO’s failure to
mandate compliance with those standards. Low quality patents may cover
inventions that are obvious. Alternatively, they may claim too much inventive
territory or fail to specify exactly what territory they cover. In recent years,
problems with low quality patents have been particularly salient in the ICT
industries.

24

Edmund Kitch bases his famous argument for granting broad patent rights very early in the
R&D process on the idea that later grants would lead to such rent-dissipating races. Edmund
Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent System”, Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 20, No.
2, 1977, pp. 265-290.
25
Richard Rouse and Gary Hardiman, “Microarray Technology: An Intellectual Property
Retrospective”, Pharmacogenomics , Vol. 4, No. 5, 2003, pp. 623-632.
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At least in the United States, some recent decisions by the Supreme Court
may alleviate some of the problems caused by low-quality patents.
Court’s 2007 decision in KSR v. Teleflex

26

The

raises the patentability requirement

of “nonobviousness” in a manner that calls into question many patents that
represent combinations of previously known information.

Additionally, the

Court’s 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange reverses prior patent law that
appeared to mandate injunctive relief once a patent had been proved valid
and infringed. Under the Court’s new standard, district courts have discretion
to award monetary damages rather than injunctions barring use of the
patented invention, particularly when the patent in question covers only a
small piece of the defendant’s product, and the patent holder is not a direct
competitor of the infringer.

27

Interestingly, one of the first Federal Circuit cases to address a district court’s
handling of damages post-eBay arises in the area of green technology. In
Paice v. Toyota, the patentee, a non-manufacturing entity, had sued Toyota
for manufacturing cars that infringed patents covering a drive train for hybrid
electric vehicles. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to
deny permanent injunctive relief and instead order Toyota to pay Paice an
“ongoing royalty.”

28

The potentially significant effects of these Supreme Court

decisions illustrate that assessments regarding whether patents are likely to
hinder or promote innovation are subject to ongoing revision.
On the other hand, even with new decisions from the courts, administrative
processes are likely, for the foreseeable future, to continue to produce
questionable patents. In the United States, the available evidence indicates
that the PTO struggles to keep quality at acceptable levels. The PTO has
fewer than 6000 examiners for the more than 400,000 patent applications
filed each year. So the typical examiner has only a few days to examine an
application on which the applicant may have spent many months.

The

examiner also bears the burden of proving a patent application is invalid.
Moreover, under the complex incentive-based compensation regime for
patent examiners, accumulating disposal credits (or “counts”) may be easier if
the examiner grants a patent application rather than denying it.

29

Similarly,

26

KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
The CAFC did, however, remand for the district court to reevaluate the royalty rate, as the
opinion had given no reason for the decision to impose a fee of $25 for every Prius II, Toyota
Highlander, Lexus RX400h manufactured during the remaining life of the infringed patent.
29
The question is not entirely clear because an examiner can also accumulate “counts” if a
patent denial results in the applicant coming back with a repeat (or “continuation”) application.
27
28
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the President of the European Patent Office has expressed concern that the
patent system is “drifting towards dysfunctionality.”

30

In addition to false positives in the form of improperly granted patents, there is
also some possibility of false negatives. There are anecdotal reports that, in
the last few years, the U.S. PTO has responded to complaints that it grants
“too many” patents by routinely (and arbitrarily) denying patent applications
the first time they are filed.

Certainly the evidence indicates that the

percentage of first applications that are denied has gone up in the last few
years.

31

Finally, in both the U.S. and Europe, there are very serious concerns about
increasing time delays in patent examination. In the U.S., total pendency for
a first application rose from 25.9 months in 2003 to 31.9 months in 2007.
Overall, the U.S. has a backlog of over 750,000 patent applications. The
delays caused by this backlog have particularly severe implications for small
firms that may use patents to attract venture capital.

2. The Case of Biotechnology
For purposes of thinking about green technology, biotechnology represents a
particularly interesting area in which to investigate in some detail the effect of
patents.

Not only will green technologies such as second and third

generation biofuels be based on biotechnology but the green technology
sector, like the biotechnology sector, is likely, in the long run, to rely heavily
on complex interactions between publicly and privately funded research.
The history of publicly funded research in biotechnology suggests several key
lessons. First, where the invention in question is a publicly funded research
platform that can be adopted by industry without transfer of tacit knowledge or
follow-on investment, the conventional rationale for patenting publicly funded
research – that patents provide incentives for such knowledge transfer and
investment – does not apply. Many of biotechnology’s most useful, widely
diffused platform technologies – including monoclonal antibodies and MaxamGilbert sequencing – were generated through public funding and were not
patented. Second, if the publicly funded platform invention does happen to

30

Alison Brimelow, “Closing remarks at the European Patent Forum”, European Patents Forum,
May 2008, available at http://www.epo.org/about-us/events/epf2008/forum/details2/closing.html
Evidence of this percentage is a bit misleading because, under current U.S. rules, there is no
such thing as a final denial of a patent application – rather, the applicant can file the same patent
application as many times as he wishes. But even taking account these continuation
applications, the percentage of applications granted appears to have decreased in recent years.
At some point, applicants appear to abandon their quest for a patent. Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven
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be patented, nonexclusive licensing should be used to ensure maximum
diffusion.

For example, although the Cohen-Boyer recombinant DNA

technologies were patented, the University of California voluntarily converted
its exclusive right into a liability rule—a non-exclusive “take and pay” rule—
under a standard form contract.

32

Although such nonexclusive licensing

increases costs relative to free technology transfer, modest licensing fees
should not impose an undue burden on commercialization.
Unfortunately, at least in the U.S., the available empirical evidence indicates
that institutions that make decisions on whether to seek patents on their
publicly funded research, and on how to license patents that they have
secured, do not always make these decisions in a manner that comports with
33

the public interest in efficient technology transfer.

Thus there is reason to

consider modifying laws such as Bayh-Dole that govern the patenting of
publicly funded research, at least to the extent that they confer unfettered
discretion over patenting to institutions that receive public funding.
In the case of research tools and platforms that are privately developed,
patents are likely to be necessary. As noted, small firms that develop such
platforms appear to need patents to attract venture capital.

Thus, for

example, patents on polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology may have
been critical to the business model of the small firm, Cetus, that initially
developed the technology. But such patents may also pose problems. Given
34

the lack of an exemption for academic research in U.S. patent law,

academics who cannot afford to pay commercial licensing fees for a key
patent must rely on the hope that the patent holder will refrain from suing
academics.

Essentially, academics must hope that the patent holders

engage in an informal regime of price discrimination. This price discrimination
ultimately arose in the case of PCR but only after some uncertainty.

35

More

generally, although academics appear routinely to ignore patents with
impunity,

36

routine lawbreaking is not necessarily a stable equilibrium.

N. Sampat, “Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?”, Stanford Public Law Working Paper No.
999098, 2008, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999098
32
Jerome H. Reichman, “Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation”, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 6, pp. 1743-1798.
33
For a review of this evidence, see David Mowery et al., Ivory Tower and Industrial Innovation:
University-Industry Technology Transfer Before and After the Bayh-Dole Act, Chicago: Stanford
University Press, 2004.
34
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
35
JH Reichman & J Giordano-Coltart, “A holistic approach to patents affecting frontier science:
Lessons from the seminal genomic technology studies”, paper presented to the European Patent
Forum, 6-7 May 2008; Ljubljana, Slovenia.
36
John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho and Wesley M. Cohen, "The View from the Bench: Patents,
Material Transfers and Biomedical Research." Science, Vol. 309., No. 5743, 2005, pp. 2002 –
2003. See also John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho and Wesley M. Cohen, “Where Excludability
Matters: Material Versus Intellectual Property in Academic Biomedical Research”, Research
Policy, Vol. 36. No. 8, 2007, pp. 1184-1203.
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While biotechnology platforms like PCR and recombinant DNA were covered
by a few patents with a single owner, other research platforms may be
covered by multiple patents held by dispersed owners, public and private.
Such thickets may become particularly salient in interdisciplinary research
areas of biotechnology, such as synthetic biology, that draw not only upon the
life sciences but also upon computer science and electrical engineering.

37

Although there is evidence that biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms may
be able to avoid thickets through infringement that is secret (e.g. infringement
of a research tool or process that is discovered only after the statute of
limitations for lawsuits has expired) or by “off-shoring” research to countries
with fewer patent restrictions,

38

these are not necessarily strategies that

should be encouraged. In addition, secret infringement may not always be
possible: for example, if (as discussed further below) synthetic biology’s goal
of producing standardized biological parts is realized, the use of such
standards may be apparent. In that case, synthetic biology may be subject to
the same possibility of holdup that we see in the information technology
industries.

39

Notably, even those analysts who are relatively optimistic about

the transaction cost difficulties associated with thickets note that “even if
patents do not stop ongoing research, the very prospect of a thicket or
restricted access may dissuade researchers from choosing particular projects
and limit lines of attack in that way.”

40

As with the legal picture in innovation generally, the legal picture in
biotechnological

innovation

is

not

stable.

The

KSR

decision

on

nonobviousness may raise the bar for patents in interdisciplinary research: to
the extent such research simply combines well known knowledge in different
fields, it may no longer be patentable. The KSR decision may also lead to
case law that makes it more difficult to secure gene patents.

b. Green Technologies
With this overview of how patents work in other, more developed,
technological areas, we can now consider how they may work in different
sectors of green technology. Some key technological areas

41

in which there

exists some nascent evidence regarding the influence of patents include: 1)
second and third generation biofuels; 2) thin-film (photovoltaic) solar; 3)

37

Reichman & Giordano-Coltart, Op. Cit.
Walsh et al. 2003.
Arti K. Rai and Sapna Kumar, “Synthetic Biology: The Intellectual Property Puzzle”, Texas Law
Review, Vol. 85, No. 7, 2007, pp. 1745–1768.
40
Wesley M. Cohen & John P. Walsh, “Real Impediments to Academic Biomedical Research”,
Innovation Policy and Economics , Vol. 8, No. 1, 2008, p. 11.
38
39
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transportation, specifically hybrid cars and fuel cells; and 4) wind energy.
These sectors are at different stages of technological development.

For

example, while third generation biofuels are still at a relatively early stage of
development,

wind

energy

and

hybrid

cars

are

already

at

the

commercialization stage. Not surprisingly, the areas in which we see some
evidence of IPR-related problems – for example, wind and hybrid cars – are
areas that are both further along commercially and where numbers of patents
have increased in recent years. (Figure 2) But even in areas where we do
not currently see difficulties, it bears emphasis that the situation may change
as recent research bears fruit in the form of issued patents and as R&D
escalates in response to appropriate GHG pricing.

Second and Third Generation Biofuels
As a purported green technology, the “first generation” biofuel of corn-based
ethanol is quite controversial: it necessarily creates a conflict between the use
of plants for food and fuel, and it has a carbon emissions profile similar to that
of fossil fuels.
In contrast, second and third generation biofuels are more promising. Second
generation biofuels include cellulosic ethanol, which is made from non-food
crop residues such as corn stover and wheat straw, or from timber and
lumber residues. In the area of cellulosic ethanol, a major challenge is the
phenomenon of “biomass recalcitrance,” a term that refers to the natural
resistance of plant cell walls to microbial and enzymatic decomposition.

42

It thus appears that small firms are finding, and patenting, novel enzymes that
catalyze such decomposition.

Then, in a pattern reminiscent of the

biopharmaceutical industry, they are collaborating with large firms in a
manner that develops the technology.

43

To date, patents do not appear to

have posed problems in this context – to the contrary, there are multiple joint
ventures working on different enzymes, and patents on enzymes appear to
have fostered markets for technology driven by small firms. More generally,
as Figure 1 shows, the number of patents granted in the biofuels area (as in

41

These are areas particularly important for developing countries.
Michael E. Himmel et al., “Biomass Recalcitrance: Engineering Plants and Enzymes for
Biofuels Production”, Science, Vol. 315, No. 5813, 2007, pp.804-807.
43
Steve Suppan, Patents: Taken for Granted in Plans for a Global Biofuels Market, IATF Working
Paper, 2007; see also John H. Barton, Intellectual Property and Access to Clean Energy
Technologies in Developing Countries: An Analysis of Solar Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind
Technologies, ICTSD Programme on Trade and the Environment, 2007, available at:
http://www.trade-environment.org/page/ictsd/projects/BARTON_DEC_2007.pdf.
42
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the biopharmaceutical industry) appears to be relatively small.

44

Of course,

the situation may change dramatically in the future, as more recent research
in this area has not yet resulted in issued patents.
Another source of worry may be patents in the area of third generation
biofuels such as those produced by synthetic biology.

Unlike traditional

recombinant DNA, which simply transfers one or more genes from one
organism to another, synthetic biology aims to create standard, modular DNA
parts that can be mixed and matched in different ways within a standard
“chassis” organism. In the biofuels context, the designer organisms created
through mixing and matching would be designed to take cellulosic feedstock
and produce fuel. At the moment, synthetic biology is sufficiently removed
from commercial application that current patent applications on items like
microbial chasses (Craig Venter’s firm Synthetic Genomics has applications
pending on several such chasses)

45

are not likely to cover the inventions that

will ultimately become the standard.

But to the extent standardization is

achieved in the future, the prospect of patents on synthetic biology standards
raises the same concerns as existing patents on various ICT standards.
Perhaps most notably, secret infringement, which (as discussed earlier)

47

46

is

currently one prominent strategy for avoiding patent thickets in the context of
biotechnology,

may

be

less

feasible

when

relevant

platforms

are

standardized.

Photovoltaic Solar
Photovoltaic technology involves the use of panels to produce electricity when
the panel is exposed to sunlight. While the first generation of this technology
used crystalline silicon, the improvement process has involved applying thin
films of semiconductors to the surface of materials like glass.

Another

important piece of PV technology involves the inverter used to convert the DC
power produced by the panels to AC power. According to John Barton, who
recently studied the photovoltaic industry, although industry players in the
developed world do patent, the industry is only moderately concentrated,
which allows choice among patented products that are substitutes for each
other.

44

See Todd Miller, James Peterson, and T. Christopher Tsang, “Patent Trends in the Cleantech
Industry”, Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 10, 2008, pp.1-8 (noting
that there has been no “noticeable increase” in the number of U.S. patents issuing in the
biofuels/synfuels area).
45
Jocelyn Kaiser, “Attempt to Patent Artificial Organism Draws A Protest”, Science, Vol. 316, No.
5831, 2007, pp. 1557.
46
See generally Sapna Kumar and Arti Rai, Op. Cit.
47
See text accompanying notes __ supra.
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In terms of aggregate patent numbers, the trends do not appear particularly
dramatic. In the U.S., the number of patents issued annually in the solar area
appear to be holding relatively steady (Fig. 2).

In the EPO, patent

applications in the solar area grew about 11% between 1998 and 2007, lower
than the 16% increase for alternative energy technologies generally.

Transportation: Hybrid Cars and Fuel Cells
As shown in Figure 2, many U.S. patents are currently being issued in the
area of fuel cells. Similarly, in the EPO, patent applications in the area of fuel
cells grew 22% between 1998 and 2007. In both this area and the area of
wind energy (discussed next), many patents may represent relatively
incremental improvements.

Thus, as with the information technology

industries, an end product could conceivably be covered by a large number of
patents, each of which contributes only a small percentage to the total value
of the invention.

Indeed, the Paice v. Toyota case, discussed above,

represented precisely this situation.

Wind
Because certain types of wind technology (e.g. windmills) have been
available for decades, patenting in this space can also represent incremental
innovation. Additionally, as shown in Figure 2, the number of issued U.S.
patents in this area have been increasing in recent years. Similarly, in the
EPO, patent applications in the area of wind power increased 31% from 1998
to 2007.
The wind turbine industry is also quite concentrated, with the top 4 firms
accounting for almost 75% of the market. In the U.S. market, General Electric
is the major player, and it has a reputation for enforcing its patents
aggressively. For example, in February 2008 GE asked the U.S. International
Trade Commission to bar imports of wind turbines made by Japan’s
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., arguing that Mitsubishi’s turbines infringe on
its patents.

Proprietary Rights Beyond Patents
There is more at stake here than patents alone.

Green technologies,

particularly in the area of second and third generation biofuels, are likely to be
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heavily dependent on access to microbial materials and associated data that
will have to be processed as part of the overall research trajectory.

48

The

challenge is to enable scientists to access vast amounts of materials and data
for upstream research, without compromising the possibilities of downstream
commercial applications that may be patented.
In other words, if all we focus on are potential patent problems, we may miss
problems caused by data protection techniques under copyright and sui
generis laws (especially the EU Database Law, which now applies in some 50
countries) as well as restrictions on access to genetic resources in material
transfer agreements. Our solutions would thus be incomplete because they
would fail to address the risk that the scientific system, even when rendered
compatible with traditional patent law, might be deprived of necessary data
(covered perhaps by crown copyrights or crown database rights in the EU) or
deprived of access to essential resource inputs, such as microbial strains held
by repositories that restrict access to their holdings even for public scientific
purposes. Hence efforts to design a worldwide microbial commons could
significantly affect the pace and direction of patented technologies, including
49

green technologies.

III. ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL PATENTING AND LICENSING
We have already alluded to the need for legal change – perhaps most notably
changes to administrative processes that currently do a poor job of granting
high-quality patents in a timely manner. But even without such legal change,
which may be difficult to achieve, much can be done to avert patent
difficulties.

a. Technology Pools
A standard mechanism for addressing certain types of patent thickets is
technology pools.

These pools function particularly well when multiple

complementary patents owned by different parties cover a platform
technology or standard.

Once the patents are pooled, licenses to the pool

can then be made available both to contributors of relevant patents and to
outsiders.

The MPEG-2 pool, which comprises patents essential for

compliance with the MPEG-2 digital compression technology standard,

48
49

Reichman, Uhlir & Daedeurdere, Designing the Microbial Commons , infra note 40.
Reichman, Uhlir & Daedeurdere, infra note 40.
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illustrates well the central features of a pro-competitive pool.

Contributing

members of the pool agree to license the patent portfolio on a
nondiscriminatory basis to all firms that request a portfolio license. Owners of
portfolio patents are also free to license their own patents independent of the
portfolio. The entity that administers the MPEG-2 pool is know as MPEG LA,
and it receives an administrative fee out of royalties collected. The MPEG LA
model has been adopted in a large number of similar situations involving
patent thickets.
As a conceptual matter, a package of innovations licensed under a nonexclusive license of this kind invites the world to make use of the package at
will, while organizing the contributors to the package as de facto partners of
all subsequent users, who labor under a contractually specified obligation to
pay reasonable royalties for follow on applications. The more successful the
package becomes, the more follow-on users it generates, and the greater are
50

the “lottery effect” royalties paid to those who contribute to the package.
In certain contexts, royalty free licensing might be adopted.

In February

2008, various firms launched the Eco-Patent Commons, which aims to pool
clean technology patents for royalty-free licensing. Thus far, the Commons is
limited in scale. It includes 47 patents, 27 owned by IBM and 12 by Xerox.
Other contributors include Nokia, Pitney Bowes, and Dupont. Whether firms
will have incentives to contribute significant numbers of patents to this type of
commons, and whether it will include patents that are ultimately useful for
reducing carbon emissions, remains to be seen. In the context of other firm
donations of patents to a commons (e.g. IBM’s donation of patents relevant to
the Linux operating system), the firms in question have had a financial
incentive to contribute, as they make products complementary to the
platforms covered by the patents in the commons.

b. Prizes
In addition to the traditional approach of using patents/licensing and basic
research funding administered via grants, another option is inducement prizes

50

On the use of these types of non-exclusive licenses, also known as liability rules, see
Reichman, Green Tulips; Reichman & Lewis, Stimulating Innovation in Developing Countries;
Reichman & Uhlir (2003); Reichman, Legal Hybrids. A concept related to liability rules (in the
sense that it creates markets for technology with low transaction costs) is a clean tech patent
clearinghouse. One such site, called Lynxstreet, was recently launched. Membership on the site
allows companies to list patents, view what others are offering, and also specify their own
technology needs. A clearinghouse site might be particularly useful for small inventors. See
Geertrui Van Overwalle Clearing House Models etc. (2009).
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for achieving specific advances in GHG-reducing science and technology.

51

The idea here is to offer financial or other rewards for achieving specific
innovation objectives that have been specified in advance.

52

Prize-like

approaches have also gained traction within the private sectors. Firms like
Innocentive match “seekers” (organizations with challenging problems) with
“solvers” (innovators with solutions) by offering them cash awards. Among
other things, Innocentive has a philanthropic subprogram devoted to “clean
tech and renewable energy” offering prizes supported by a private foundation.
Although inducement prizes are not suited to all research and innovation
objectives, they have the potential to play a larger role alongside research
contracts and grants. In contrast to these other instruments, prizes target and
reward innovation outputs rather than inputs: the prize is paid only if the
objective is attained. This can help encourage maximal research effort per
dollar of public research funding. Prizes or awards can also help to focus
efforts on specific high-priority objectives, without specifying how the goal is
to be accomplished. Because prize competitors select themselves based on
their own knowledge of their likelihood of success—rather than being selected
in advance by a research manager—prizes can also attract a more diverse
and potentially effective range of innovators from universities, other research
institutions and the private sector.
The detailed process of selecting appropriate prize topics and crafting prizespecific rules (e.g., the type of contest, size of award, criteria for winning,
method of choosing winner, whether patents will be sought on the targeted
invention)

53

requires extensive consultation with experts and potential

participants. Identification of particular technical and scientific challenges in
GHG mitigation that could be fruitfully addressed through an inducement prize
approach could be identified as part of the above systematic assessment.
Then the best institutional arrangements for administering the prize would
need to be determined. Consideration would need to be given to the
treatment of intellectual property arising from associated innovations (as with
any joint R&D project), and to the development of terms for related licensing.

51

Richard G. Newell, A U.S. Innovation Strategy for Climate Change Mitigation. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, December 2009.
Richard G. Newell and N. Wilson, Technology Prizes for Climate Mitigation, RFF Discussion
Paper 05-33; National Research Council, Innovation Inducement Prizes at the National Science
Foundation. Recently proposed prizes relevant to energy and climate policy include “Prizes for
Achievement in Grand Challenges of Science and Technology” authorized in the U.S. Energy
Policy Act of 2005, the H-Prize (for hydrogen) and Bright Tomorrow Lighting Prizes authorized in
the U.S. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, the privately-funded Progressive
52
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IV. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Thus far, we have focused on the intellectual property situation in the OECD
context (and particularly the U.S. context). This focus is justifiable to the
extent that more than 95% of global R&D currently takes place in OECD
countries. However, reduction of GHG emissions will necessarily be a global
effort. Thus in this Part we explicitly consider issues of technology transfer to
developing countries as well as innovation in developing countries.

a. Prizes and Other Funding in the International Context
Prizes could be particularly useful for advancing innovation specifically
relevant to developing country climate mitigation and adaptation technology
needs, given the relatively low market-driven inducement for innovation that
may be present in those countries.

54

For similar reasons, the use of

innovation prizes has been advocated for medical advances particularly
55

relevant to developing countries (e.g., anti-malaria drugs).

One advantage

of a prize approach relative to research grants in an international context is
that it would not require choosing the winner of R&D funding in advance,
which can become politically charged when researchers and research
institutions reside in particular countries.
An internationally coordinated climate technology prize fund could be
established for these purposes. While contributions for such a fund could be
sought on an as-needed basis for specific projects, it would probably be
advantageous to have larger-scale general funds that could then be
prioritized to specific prize topics.
In addition to a prize fund, a fund that provided peer-reviewed research grants
could also be established.

A portion of this fund could be set aside for

scientists and innovators in developing countries and thus provide them with
opportunities and outlets for innovative proposals that do not otherwise exist
56

at the present time.

Automotive X-Prize, and the Earth Challenge Prize announced by British financier Richard
Branson. Only the last two private prizes have been funded.
53
National Research Council, Innovation Inducement Prizes at the National Science Foundation.
54
See Richard Newell, International Climate Technology Strategies, Discussion Paper 2008-12,
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Oct. 2008.
55
James Love and Tim Hubbard, “The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines”,
Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 3, 2007, 1519-1546.
56
For analogous proposals in regard to medical research, see Abbott & Reichman , “The Doha
Round's Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines
Under the Amended TRIPS Provisions”, Journal of International Economic Law, VOL. 10, NO. 4,
2007, 983-84.
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b. Buying Out and Pooling Intellectual Property
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN
FCCC) and WIPO could also consider establishing a “Global Fund” within the
WIPO for the potential purchase of intellectual property.

57

The UN FCCC,

adopted at Rio in 1992, already contains provisions for technology transfer
and financial assistance for agreed incremental costs to developing countries.
Its Kyoto Protocol added further assistance provisions. And the demand-side
incentives in a global regime that used a tax or cap and trade system to limit
GHG emissions would spur a flow of funds and technology to developing
countries in allowance sale transactions.

But the parties to the climate

change treaties could go further to address IPRs through the collaboration
with WIPO that we are now sketching.
Specifically, a Global Fund could “buy out” selected intellectual property rights
and then make the innovation available to others, especially developing
countries, as if it were in the public domain or at least a semicommons. An
earlier proposal to this effect for pharmaceuticals was made by Professor
Kevin Outterson, who pointed out that the aggregate value of the rights to
poor country markets may be relatively small, in which case significant public
58

health impact could be achieved with such an investment.

Because the

inventor will normally have recouped R&D expenses and made the bulk of his
profits in OECD countries, such a strategy provides him with an extra source
of income while relieving him of concerns about the enforcement of IPRs in
the countries for which rights have been purchased. However, thought must
be given to the possibility of restricting re-exports of the products developed
under such arrangements back into OECD countries under various theories of
exhaustion, lest they undermine the innovator’s returns from investments in
his primary markets.
An organization that administered buyouts might also arrange to pool
technologies or inputs to essential technologies, with a view to making them
available as a package to innovators, especially innovators in developing
countries. This strategy looks promising and has already produced positive
results in the pharmaceutical sector. For example, public-private partnerships

57

See Richard Newell, International Climate Technology Strategies, Discussion Paper 2008-12,
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Oct. 2008.
Kevin Outerson, “Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease Innovations for Low- and Middle-Income
Countries”, American Journal of Law and Medicine, Vol. 32, 2006, 171-73. Somewhat analogous
proposals have also been made by James Love, “Proposal for Patent Pool for Essential
Medicines
(PPEM)”,
Addis
Ababa--3
March
2005,
available
at
http://www.cptech.org/cm/addisababa03032005.html, and Jenny Lanjouw[?]. See also Yochai
Benkler, Amy Kapczynski et alia, Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing
Approach for University Innovations, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2005, pp.
1031-1114.
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have successfully pooled patented technologies under the auspices of DNDi,
59

with a view to introducing two new malaria drugs onto the market.

c. Technology Transfer and International R&D Agreements
At least in the near term, much of the relevant R&D for clean technology will
occur in the developed world.

Transferring the resulting technological

knowledge and equipment to developing countries—and ensuring that
technologies develop that are appropriate—will require additional actions at
an international level. While technology-transfer strategies must address
typical impediments to technology adoption, such as information availability
and technological maturity, they also must address financing barriers specific
to developing countries. The degree of intellectual property rights protection,
rule of law, regulatory transparency, and market openness are also critical
conditions and potential impediments bearing on technology transfer.
Activities undertaken under knowledge sharing and coordination agreements
can include meeting, planning, exchange of information, the coordination and
harmonization of research agendas and measurement standards, and some
degree of integrated, cooperative R&D.

60

In addition to increasing

international exchange of scientific and technical information, joint R&D can
more directly increase cost-effectiveness through cost-sharing and reduced
duplication of effort. The largest number of existing international agreements
relevant to climate mitigation technology have been developed as so-called
Technology Implementing Agreements under the auspices of the IEA.

61

IEA

Implementing Agreements use two primary mechanisms: task-sharing and
cost-sharing. In task-sharing, a joint program is pursued within participating
countries, but each country funds and implements its own contribution to the
project. In cost-sharing, participating countries pool funding for a single
contractor to perform a research task. There are 41 existing IEA
Implementing Agreements, all of which incorporate task-sharing and about
half of which have cost-sharing. They cover the fields of renewable energy
and hydrogen (10), end-use energy efficiency (13), fossil-fuel technologies
(6), nuclear fusion energy (9), and cross-cutting activities (3). Membership in
these agreements is not restricted to governments or to IEA or OECD

59

DNDi Press Release, June 23, 2008, DNDi Partners With Pharma, Biotech, Academia, Public
Health
Institutes
&
NGOs
to
Deliver
Lifesaving
Drugs,
available
at
http://www.dndi.org/cms/public_html/
insidearticleListing.asp?CategoryId=166&SubCategoryId=167&ArticleId=490&TemplateId=1
60
de Coninck et al., “International Technology-Oriented Agreements To Address Climate
Change”, Energy Policy, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2008, pp. 335-356; IEA, Energy Technology
Perspectives 2008.
61
de Coninck et al, Op. Cit.

www.chathamhouse.org.uk

25

Programme paper: EEDP 08/03

countries, and a number of organizations from non-OECD countries have
participated. Activities under these agreements are funded and conducted
primarily through domestic R&D programs and budgets, and pooled funds
often go to the bundling of research results and provision of a platform for
information exchange and learning (i.e., desk studies rather than primary
research).
In addition, other agreements have also been developed in recent years,
including the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum, the Asia Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate, and the International
Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy.

Energy science and technology

agreements that feature a higher degree of joint, collaborative R&D are less
common, and appear to be most successful in research that is more
fundamental and that has not yet accumulated commercial interests.
Examples include the ITER fusion reactor and European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN).
Invigorated and expanded international agreements on climate technology
mitigation R&D coordination could be very valuable, particularly as countries
increase R&D efforts and seek maximal impact in addressing this global
62

problem. The IEA is the best-positioned international institution to administer
any such agreement(s) related to energy technology, although other
international institutions may be more appropriate to engage for non-energy
technologies. One concern with the existing IEA implementing agreements,
however, is that they each have their own secretariats and operate
independently. While this approach eases the need for more central
administration, it may also suffer from overlap across agreements, and a lack
of overall coordination and strategic vision.
G8, other major R&D-performing countries, and likely major developing
country technology users, could therefore consider agreeing to an overall
framework for knowledge-sharing and coordination of climate mitigation R&D
63

efforts.

This framework could include a process whereby parties make

regular submissions of a climate technology development plan, including R&D
funding levels, current and future program plans, pertinent R&D policies, and
other relevant information. In addition to such national submissions, the
process could include an evaluation of existing climate technology
agreements—with an eye toward identifying best practices and expanding,
integrating, or suspending particular agreements—and draw from other
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See Richard Newell, International Climate Technology Strategies, Discussion Paper 2008-12,
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, Oct. 2008.
63
Ibid.
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related national level and international efforts by the European Union ,
Japan,

65

66

the United States,

and IEA work in support of G8 and other

67

processes.

At a minimum, the process would monitor progress, share information on
individual national efforts in an integrated manner, and identify where
68

overlaps and gaps exist across countries.

One mechanism under this

framework could also include the development of roadmaps to assess the
current development status of particular technologies, systems, and relevant
areas of underlying science, including the identification of appropriate
milestones and necessary R&D funding levels. The framework would also
provide a more systematic means for improving the cost-effectiveness of R&D
by identifying particular areas where it makes sense for individual countries to
focus on sub-parts of an integrated overall package and areas where joint
funding is sensible. An agreement could also set out general guidelines for
expectations for the magnitude of task-sharing and cost-sharing across
countries for collaborative R&D projects. This framework could also highlight
the importance of human talent to both knowledge development and transfer,
by helping to identify high-priority areas for scholarly exchange—including
from developing to developed countries.
An international agreement could also be fashioned to increase domestic
funding of climate technology R&D, analogous to internationally agreed
emission targets for each country.

69

International agreement over the

necessary level and reasonable burden-sharing of R&D effort across parties
could be valuable. Such an agreement could, for example, target a level of
climate technology R&D as a percentage of GDP, or as a percentage
increase from recent levels, with those levels set with the intention of
significantly expanding R&D. The general idea is not without precedent: in
2002 the European Union set the goal of increasing its relatively low level of
overall R&D intensity—currently 1.8 percent of GDP—to 3 percent of GDP by
2010.

70

The goal is EU-wide rather than country-specific and applies jointly to

both public and private R&D funding. However, there is little evidence of
measurable progress toward the goal thus far, although ongoing discussions
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among government representatives and major R&D-performing companies
have illuminated many of the key impediments.
A more detailed example—albeit in the medical rather than climate arena—is
the 2005 proposal to the World Health Organization for a Treaty on Medical
Research and Development.

71

The core country obligations in the proposal

are for minimum levels of support for qualified medical R&D (both general and
“priority” areas), measured as a share of GDP, according to a schedule
varying by national income. Among other things, the proposal also identifies
methods of qualified R&D financing (e.g., direct public support, tax
expenditures, philanthropic expenditures, and certain business R&D).
Specifically with regard to energy, the IEA already collects annual data on
public energy R&D spending by IEA countries, a process that could be
72

adjusted if necessary to serve a more formal purpose.

Such an agreement

could incorporate a “pledge and review” structure, and the necessary
reporting on funding levels integrated with the regular climate technology
development plan submissions described above. Targets could be structured
as a share of GDP, as a percentage increase from recent levels, or some
other metric. The IEA could serve as the review body—either directly or as an
assistant to a UNFCCC Expert Group on Technology Development. The
process could also include a broader energy innovation policy review
element: the IEA already conducts regular reviews of the energy policies,
include energy technology policies, of IEA member countries and other major
energy consumers and producers

73

d. Impediments to Technology Transfer, with Particular Regard to
Intellectual Property Rights
As we have discussed, IPRs provide incentives to invest in R&D and operate
as modalities for recouping those investments and turning a profit, despite the
intangible and essentially non-rivalrous character of intellectual creations in
the raw state of affairs. To this end, the TRIPS Agreement of 1994, by
harmonizing international minimum

standards of intellectual property

protection within the confines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, aimed to improve the baseline conditions for the transfer of
knowledge and technology in a global marketplace.

74

The “incipient
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transnational system of innovation”

75

emerging from this Agreement has

created incentives and opportunities for entrepreneurs in developing countries
once they become capable of producing and exporting knowledge goods to
an increasingly competitive global market.
In principle, this worldwide intellectual property system should encourage the
transfer of climate-change technology to and from developing countries.
Even if returns generated by IP protection in these countries are relatively
small, the availability of such protection should stimulate some transfer as
well as foreign direct investment (FDI).

Thus developing country

governments should give careful thought to mechanisms for addressing the
fears of foreign innovators regarding lax protection of their IPRs. Besides
implementing their enforcement obligations under TRIPS,

76

governments

should consider devising ways and means outside of their intellectual
property and administrative laws to reassure companies that are willing to
cooperate in transfers of essential technologies.

While states may not

discriminate against other states with regard to such laws, a long GATT
tradition does allow governments to make better deals with cooperative
companies than with others who may drag their heels.
On the negative side, however, there is evidence that the TRIPS Agreement
has produced an adverse impact on access to essential public goods,
especially in areas like public health and agriculture.

And when thinking

about potential problems in advance of their becoming acute in the
environmental sector, it is well to remember that although the TRIPS
agreement sets up a baseline of protection, it also has a variety of provisions
that give developing countries some flexibility in addressing access issues.
Thus it is worth emphasizing that governments in developing countries can
under TRIPS maintain relatively stiff standards of patentability. Of course,
stiff standards of eligibility must apply without discrimination to both national
and foreign innovators. But these same standards might widen the space in
which local companies could reverse engineer foreign innovations that fail to
qualify and still obtain, say, utility model rights or “compensatory liability”
rights in incremental innovations of their own. These same regimes might
also serve to protect small-scale innovations held by foreigners, without

Vol. 22, No. 4, 1989, pp. 689–745; Reichman, “Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
Under the TRIPS Agreement”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.
29, 1996, pp. 11-93.
75
Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, “The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
the Privatization of Global Public Goods”, in K.E. Maskus & J.H. Reichman (eds.), International
Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime,
Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 3-45.
76
TRIPS Agreement, arts 41-49. See Reichman, “Enforcing the Enforcement Provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement”, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, 1997, pp. 335-339.
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generating the thickets of rights and other barriers to entry that too many
patents can produce.
Even when foreign companies qualify for patent protection under suitably
exigent domestic patent laws, the existence of second-tier regimes provides
incentives to local firms to adapt such inventions to local circumstances and
to improve upon them. Moreover, the Japanese experience demonstrates
that local firms that obtain second-tier rights of this kind in improvements then
possess tradable rights that can become bargaining chips when dealing with
large transnational corporations. By the same token, the fact that a local
company can obtain, say, only a utility model right or a liability regime at
home, in no way affects the patentability of its innovation in other countries,
especially OECD countries.

This is an important advantage of the

“independence of patents” doctrine, incorporated into TRIPS,

77

which

developing countries could leverage in the environmental sector so as to
generate more significant profits in countries with larger markets.
Should tensions surrounding access in the environmental sector mount as
they have in the pharmaceutical sector, the primary defensive options for
developing countries would reside in article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement,
which allows compulsory licenses to be issued on patented inventions for
almost any reason, subject to the payment of compensation and certain other
technical prerequisites.

78

Here developing countries have a wide array of

defensive options that must be carefully evaluated and duly supported by
legislative and administrative provisions.
For example, one of the most relevant and least studied of these options is
79

the right to enact compulsory licenses for so-called dependent patents.

These licenses kick in when second comers develop patented improvements
on existing dominant inventions, and they permit the improver to exercise his
patent, despite its infringing posture, in exchange for a cross-license to and
from the holder of a dominant patent.

In effect, this compulsory license

avoids blocking effects by manufacturing a liability rule solution for improvers.
Compulsory licenses for anticompetitive practices and behavior afford
developing countries another set of options, especially when foreign firms
refuse to deal with local firms or refuse to make technologies available at
prices that local firms can afford.
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Paris Convention, art. 4bis, TRIPS art 2.1.
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79
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While U.S. competition law would not necessarily support compulsory
licenses on such grounds, they are fully established in international patent law
and are increasingly invoked under the European Commission’s own
competition law and policy, which closely regulates potential “abuses of a
dominant position” by holders of IPRs.

Compulsory licenses issued for

anticompetitive behavior under article 8, 31(k) and 40 of the TRIPS
Agreement are subject to minimum restrictions and prerequisites, other than
some administrative or judicial procedures, and even the right to
compensation may be virtually nullified by such behavior.
Another compulsory license that might be relevant to the environmental
sector is the government use license. Under a government use license, a
private contractor may be made an agent of the government for purposes of
manufacturing the patented product and making it available to the public at
large. Such activity is immunized against an infringement action in the courts.
Instead, the patentee must seek adequate compensation from the
government itself, which can be measured in terms of local conditions.
Government use licenses are also subject to very few prerequisites, they can
be rapidly issued for virtually any reason, and the relevant transaction costs
are low.
Still another form of compulsory license widely used in the EU and elsewhere
is the so-called “public interest” compulsory license. On this approach, the
government may enable third-party private contractors to produce the
patented goods without license from the patentee, if the public interest
requires the goods in question to be made available in greater quantities or at
lower prices than the patentee is willing to accept. Such licenses do require
notice and prior negotiations with right holders, and prior negotiations
themselves usually suffice to break the bottleneck in question without actual
need to issue the license in the end. Recently, in the context of public health
needs, both France and Belgium have enacted laws allowing the issuance of
expedited public interest compulsory licenses for public health purposes,
although no such licenses have yet been issued.

80

It needs to be stressed, moreover, that the existence of these defensive
measures gives rise to certain offensive possibilities if planning and
coordination problems are otherwise properly managed. Here we refer to
interest in pooled procurement strategies that can enable poor countries to
boost their bargaining power with respect to foreign suppliers of needed
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See Part 2, Section 2 of Geertrui van Overwalle (Ed.), Gene Patents and Public Health,
Brussels, Bruylant, 2007.
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technologies.

81

From this perspective, there are gains of trade to be made

when small countries coordinate their procurement strategies, especially
when the objective is to stimulate foreign producers to lower the price of
technologies or even to establish local production facilities in a given region.
By pooling their purchasing requirements, countries may achieve economies
of scale and scope that will entice foreign suppliers to deal on more favorable
terms. Moreover, coordinated procurement strategies toughen the threat of
compulsory licenses—if all the participating governments are willing to issue
them—while sweetening the carrots of cooperative behavior by offering
originators (or willing producers of substitutes) a larger market in which to
establish their trademarks, sell their products, or even establish local
production. Pooled procurement strategies with or without compulsory
licenses look ever more promising in the pharmaceutical sector
83

however, special enabling legislation already exists),

82

(where,

and they should be

carefully evaluated for application in the environmental sector as well.
However, most of these defensive measures are subject to certain technical,
legal, and political constraints. For example, a threat to issue a compulsory
license may be meaningless if the country possesses no capacity to reverseengineer the product or process in question, unless it can obtain similar
products from other countries where they are off patent or available under the
doctrine of exhaustion.

Similarly, most compulsory licenses under article

31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement must be made “predominantly for the supply of
the local market,” which means no more than 49.9% of the production can be
exported to another country (unless such exports can conceivably be justified
as an “exception” within article 30).

84

These restrictions can also hinder

implementation of pooled procurement strategies, at least to the extent that
they depend on compulsory licensing.
Of course, climate mitigation technology is quite different from the
pharmaceutical sector, in which many of these defensive measures have
been used.

Because pharmaceutical products are generally quite

inexpensive at marginal cost, developing countries have eagerly embraced
such products (and have resisted attempts to raise cost through patent
restrictions). In contrast, absent GHG pricing, certain green technology can
be more expensive than conventional technology even when sold at marginal
cost. Nonetheless these measures demonstrate that there are means for the
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international community to address threats to the public good if and when
IPRs become an impediment.

e. Indigenous Innovation in Developing Countries
Much of the international climate negotiations, as well as the academic
literature, have operated on the assumption that green climate-friendly
technologies will primarily or exclusively be developed in wealthy countries,
and will then need to be transferred to poor countries through private or public
mechanisms. This model of innovation in wealthy countries and diffusion to
poor countries has characterized other fields of technology, such as
pharmaceuticals (discussed above). And it is underscored by the reality that
95% of global R&D spending currently takes place in wealthy countries.
But the future may hold significant potential for indigenous innovation of green
climate-friendly technology within at least some developing countries. If so,
the global pattern of climate R&D will look different from that of prior
technologies, and the need for technology transfer from OECD countries to
others may be somewhat reduced.

At the same time, the promise of

indigenous innovation in developing countries will require attention to the
incentive systems operating within those developing countries. The same
choices and debates about the design and limits on IPRs and alternative
incentive instruments, discussed above in the context of wealthy countries,
will then arise anew in developing countries.
There are several reasons to expect greater supply of indigenous
technological innovation in developing countries regarding green energy or
climate change, as contrasted to other fields of R&D. First, the impetus for
climate-friendly innovation will be greatest in the wealthiest of developing
countries, not the poorest. Unlike in the case of essential medicines, where
the countries most in need are also the poorest with the least capacity to
innovate, in the case of energy and climate technology the major developing
countries most in need – that is, the largest emitting countries who will be
most called on to reduce their emissions – are the wealthiest with the greatest
capacity to innovate. Growing greenhouse gas emissions usually (though not
inevitably) correlates with rising energy use, electrification, vehicle ownership
and distance traveled, and wealth.
Notably, China, India, and Brazil are three of the largest greenhouse gas
emitters in the world (China having surpassed the USA in 2007 to become the
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world’s largest CO2 emitter).

They are also three of the wealthiest

developing countries. Indeed they are emerging great powers. They still
have significantly lower per capita income than OECD countries, but their
aggregate GDP is rising to the point that it equals or surpasses many OECD
countries. While GDP in Europe and the USA has been growing at about 2 or
3 percent per year over the past decade, China’s GDP has been growing at
over 10 percent per year over that period. (On present forecasts, China may
be the world’s largest economy with a decade or two, although the 2008
economic crisis may reduce growth rates in both China and OECD countries.)
Other major emitters among developing countries, such as Indonesia and
South Africa, are less wealthy and are growing more slowly economically, but
are still among the better-off among developing countries and thus capable of
supporting indigenous innovation. The only large GHG emitters among the
very poor developing countries are those experiencing rapid deforestation,
such as in central Africa. Technical innovation in agriculture and cooking may
be important to slow deforestation and thus reduce GHG emissions in those
very poor countries (in order to reduce demand for converting forests to
farmland, and for clearing forests for fuelwood, respectively). Some of this
innovation may come from elsewhere and be transferred to these countries,
but even here there are prospects for indigenous innovation in farming and
cooking methods.
Second, the wealthier developing countries already have large communities
of well-educated professionals working in R&D. China and India are already
home to a large percentage of the world’s scientists and engineers. Brazil is
already a world leader in liquid fuel technologies.

This human capital

advantage in high GHG-emitting developing countries is the opposite of the
human capital deficit in poor countries seeking pharmaceuticals for destitute
poplations.
Third, credit is available to finance indigenous R&D. At least some of these
emerging powers, most obviously China, have large pools of available credit.
China created a new sovereign investment fund in 2007 endowed with
approximately $400 billion, and in early November 2008 announced a new
domestic infrastructure investment initiative of $586 billion over the next two
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years.

86

Foreign investors will add to these financial markets. This trend may

be reinforced if the current credit market problems in the US and Europe
continue and come to make investment opportunities in China, India and
Brazil seem relatively more attractive.
Fourth, there is a nascent community of venture capital firms already at work
in China and other major developing countries. This source of financing and
entrepreneurial insight can be critical to small start-up firms.
Fifth, there is at least domestic demand for innovation to reduce emissions.
As China adds a new coal-fired electric power plant each week (and India
adds one about every other week), its coal combustion yields not only CO2
but also SO2, NOx, fine particulates, and black carbon.

87

The public health

damage from these co-pollutants is serious (in China, up to 750,000 deaths
88

per year).

Moreover, this public health burden is increasingly recognized by

those countries’ leaders as both a drag on economic growth
political unrest.

90

89

and a source of

Thus political leaders in these countries have incentives to

promote domestic public R&D spending to reduce these emissions; and
domestic pollution control policies in these countries may spur private
investment in such domestic innovation.
Sixth, if the demand-side market failure of climate change is corrected with a
price on carbon (via carbon taxes or a cap and trade regime), and if that
policy applies to the major developing countries, then there will be incentives
for innovation within those countries to reduce GHG emissions. For example,
there would be incentives to reduce CO2 emissions from coal combustion
(via, e.g. carbon capture and storage), and CH4 emissions from natural gas
pipelines, ruminant animals and rice cultivation. If indigenous innovation can
reduce these emissions at lower cost than through imported external
innovation, the country would benefit from lower abatement costs (and from
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the opportunity to sell emissions allowances on the world market, if a cap and
trade regime is adopted).
Seventh, several countries may serve as role models. These countries have
recently succeeded in stimulating indigenous technological innovation as part
of their vault from poor to wealthy, including admission to OECD membership.
For example, in the last three decade in South Korea and on Taiwan have
demonstrated that indigenous innovation in manufacturing, electronics,
biomedicine, and related industries can be part of rapid economic growth in
Asia.
These factors are already spurring increased innovation in the energy sector
in major developing countries. In China, innovation has accelerated in recent
years.

91

This trend is publicly associated with President Hu Jintao’s

commitment to “harmonious society” and the “scientific concept of
development.”
To be sure, future progress in green or climate-friendly indigenous innovation
in developing countries will depend on several factors. One is the effective
demand for new methods of reducing GHG emissions as a result of policies
to raise the price of emissions. A second is the reach of this demand across
diverse sectors in which several GHGs are emitted, including electricity
generation, vehicles, buildings, agriculture, and forests. A third is the role of
IPRs or alternatives within these countries in stimulating the supply of new
technologies, as discussed in prior sections of this paper.
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A fourth is the

93

general ease of doing business within these economies.

Thus, it will be important to study the design of IPRs or alternatives to
encourage green climate-friendly technological R&D in major developing
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countries, as well as in wealthy countries.

Lessons from the performance of

IPRs in energy and agricultural sectors in wealthy countries may be useful in
this effort, provided that the different economic and social context of each
developing country is understood.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this report, we provide an analysis of how IPRs, and alternatives to IPRs,
might operate in green innovation. Because IPR challenges are likely to arise
(if at all) only after sufficient levels of innovation have been generated by a
combination of appropriate GHG pricing and public funding, we rely heavily
on analogies to existing technological sectors that are currently experiencing
difficulties. In addition, because over 95% of global R&D is currently
generated in OECD countries, we focus on these countries in our discussion
of IPR challenges. However, if climate change is going to be addressed
successfully, clean technology must be adopted globally. Thus, our paper
concludes by examining at some length the international context.

Source: Clarke et al. (2006, p. 6.5).
Figure 1. Cumulative global mitigation costs under alternative technology scenarios
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